Let’s presuppose that the purpose of war includes the need to compel another to one’s will. Does this satisfy the previously mentioned purposes of war stated or alluded to by the other theorists?

 

I would say, yes.

 

1. In regards to bringing stability back to society: We look toward the causes of instability that may have occurred. If poor or corrupt governance has caused societal problems, then using force to compel a change in government would be to compel its will. If instability resulted from criminal activity, gangs, and bandits, using force to defeat their organizations or compel them to cease their actions would also suffice.

2. In regards to preserving the political body of the state: When either from external or internal forces that are trying to compel their will on the governing body by affirming the authority of the state, resisting their influence, and fighting back to defeat them, this would be to compel their will.

3. In regards to increasing and maintaining the political power of leaders: Leaders use military force to expand boundaries, gain spoils from looted territories, gain access to resources, weaken adversaries, and even embolden disgruntled citizenry through the use of military action to rally support for this claim. Additionally, leaders desire political leverage, the ability to shape their power base, and influence their people through war. These are all to compel their will.

4. In regards to protecting one’s people: This may very well be the most fundamental compulsion organized conflict seeks to achieve. With a secure society, the only threats to one’s people are external, so wars on the periphery of a state may erupt. Boundaries are expanded and coffers filled with spoils, but that can make the state strong and force the horrors of war away from the heart of the state where one’s people reside. Additionally, unorganized and organized militias exist for this very purpose. Allowing one’s people to carry out their way of life and conduct themselves according to their desires requires the people and their government to use force to compel this will upon those that would work against it.

5. In regards to compelling adversaries to change: This is one of the clearest  examples of compelling one’s will on another. If there is something about an adversary; such as their military strength or activities, their economic and commercial policy, how they govern their people, or the current geopolitical situation, then using military force to change this would be an example.

6. In regards to achieving the will of the state: This is simply the foundational catalyst for any action that the state takes. If the will of the state is to achieve certain metrics or to shape certain environments it deems necessary for change; then it can take whatever action or use whatever tool they desire to get it done. One such tool could be war, and it would be to compel others to this will.

 

In any case, the concept of compelling another group to one’s will would be an integral aspect of the purpose of war, if not the underlying framework of the ways and means of warfare. Our employment of military forces, the establishment of doctrine, the training and equipment of our forces for war, and the targeting and defeating of the enemy’s military power and plans appear to be the action of our will against the enemy’s. As a result, it is an important aspect that defines war.

 

If we could compel another group’s will to change voluntarily, and the action was overt, would that be considered an aspect of war?

 

Possibly.

 

In one instance, I wouldn’t consider it an aspect of war if the influence took the form of something mutually beneficial. For example, through negotiation we offer monetary compensation, diplomatic treaties, or trade opportunities in order to gain access to ports for trade; those could be considered as solely the domain of trade and commerce even if the consequence of those voluntary arrangements had some military benefit. This would be akin to modern treaties that offer access to ports for both military and non-military vessels to refit and refuel in exchange for some benefit; such as defense promises with the host nation. Suppose this similar arrangement was compelled through the threatened use of military force, such as the U.S. Navy’s Commodore Mathew Perry's opening up of Japan in the Convention of Kanagawa in 1854 AD. In that case, this could be considered an aspect of war in line with other forms of “gunboat diplomacy” and “saber-rattling.” And, of course, you can achieve the same arrangement that would be considered overt and compelled coercion through military violence; such as the Opium Wars that led the Qing Dynasty to sign numerous “unequal treaties” that they couldn’t resist militarily.

 

Overtly saying that one nation desires a change in another and will use various tools to make it happen doesn’t necessarily mean it is an aspect of war. If the tool is desirable; money, resources, treaties, or other objects, then this appears to be a voluntary exchange. While overt military operations would be considered an aspect of war, displaying military power while not directly engaging in military action might be considered an aspect of war. On the other hand, it may simply be considered an aspect of diplomacy through the display of military power. Indeed, war itself may very well be diplomacy with a violent veneer, and we shouldn’t view war as a separate entity but as an integral element of it. Regardless, whether something that is compelled is seen as an aspect of war seems to rely heavily on the recipient of that influence, both 1) not desiring the change and 2) not being able to resist without severe negative consequences.

 

What if we could compel another group's will to change voluntarily, and the action was covert, meaning that the influence to change was an intentional act unbeknownst to the enemy, would this be an aspect of war?

 

Possibly.

 

The use of clandestine operations through spies or deception has a storied history in statecraft. Both ancient and contemporary theorists have noted the dangers involved in battle so desired to shape conditions where objectives could be achieved without the need for battle or to create such an advantage that victory in battle is almost certain. Our biggest issue with trying to find historical examples of clandestine operations being utilized is that we have to trust that our primary sources are accurately telling us of their occurrences. Overt battles are difficult to hide from all involved, but the successful utilization of sabotage, assassination, or deception may only be known to the actual spies, saboteurs, and leaders that played a part. Regardless of whether we can find accurate examples, we can discuss them as hypotheticals.

 

If looking at compelling change through covert action and seeing if the action would be an aspect of war, we may need to consider whether it would lead to a violent response or a worsened diplomatic relationship if the covert activity became known. If an assassination by a foreign government against a particular person was to weaken the strength of a nation; either diplomatically or militarily, then it could lead to conflict. Suppose the target was a journalist or a business magnate. In that case, I doubt that would be considered an aspect of war as it may not necessarily impact military or diplomatic strength.

 

Industrial espionage, stealing state secrets, could be an aspect of war but not lead to war. We can look at contemporary American military technology stolen by America’s adversaries only increasing animosity between the two but doesn’t compel a military response against it. I would, however, consider it an aspect of war because it does weaken the United States to lose its technological edge over its adversaries should a conflict arise.

 

Additionally, the use of clandestine operations to damage military and non-military infrastructure or hurt and kill military personnel and civilians could be considered an act of war if discovered. Suppose the United States discovered that an adversary attempted to destroy hydroelectric dams, contaminate a city’s water supply, destroy an electrical grid, or damage military facilities. In that case, the consequences of such an action’s success, if it had occurred, might be so damaging that it would compel the United States to war, then I would consider it to be an aspect of war.

 

If the use of non-destructive methods is not clandestine but still having covert intentions, then it may be considered an aspect of war. Such as establishing alliances with the covert purpose of putting a potential adversary in a weakened position. The adversary would not desire to be put in such a position and may be compelled to war if it was discovered that the intent of the alliance was specifically to put them at a disadvantage.  Similarly, a nation can make the strategic development of new trade relationships and manufacturing in preparation for a possible future conflict in such a way as to not alarm the targeted nation and lull them into a false sense of security. If these preparatory arrangements were discovered, war could be the response.

 

So, in regards to whether a covert action could be considered an aspect of war is based on whether such an action 1) has an impact on the diplomatic or military capabilities of the targeted state and 2) if discovered, would compel the targeted state to war or ramp up adversarial rhetoric.

 

Would the use of military force be considered an aspect of war?

 

Yes, mostly.

 

If we consider using military force to imply military action against another nation or group, yes, I would say that this can be considered an aspect of war. Utilizing military force for combat operations, training for combat, force projection, and forward deployments would all be aspects of war as they directly impact military and diplomatic conditions. That would be the most straightforward consideration.

 

However, not all actions that a military force can take would be considered an aspect of war though it could be considered an additional requirement to their duties. Here are some examples:

 

For the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), in addition to providing the US Army’s engineering needs, it also helps manage and maintain multiple civil works projects, such as dams, levees, and navigation channels, as well as environmental restoration efforts. This was originally to justify their continued funding during America’s earlier years when it didn’t desire to retain a large standing military. Serving as a tool for infrastructure development and maintenance was a rationalization to keep the funding so these engineers could hone and retain their skills during times of peace by providing value in a non-military capacity. So, in this case, the use of military force in this non-military capacity was not an aspect of war; however, used as a justification to keep them around and capable should war flare up in the future.

 

Since the Former Han Dynasty of China, popularized by Cao Cao of the Later Han and Three Kingdoms Period, the Chinese once utilized a system called Tuntian, whose literal translation is “garrisoning farms.” Basically, they turned soldiers into part-time farmers. The purpose was twofold, 1) to provide additional subsistence to military forces far out on the frontier of the Chinese empire fighting nomadic barbarians, and 2) to develop the agricultural capabilities of the local area for future civil development. Naturally, long logistical supply chains can weaken a military force, as any hiccup in the chain can spell doom for those warriors on the front line. By requiring the soldiers to till, sow, maintain, and harvest fields, they can provide their own subsistence, become self-sufficient, and be more resilient on the frontier. Additionally, the state doesn't take from civilian harvests. Instead, harvests can be used to fill granary reserves, to trade, or simply be used by the locals for a more calorie-rich diet. War or not, warriors need to eat just as much as civilians; though maybe more so in order to maintain their strength and energy for their soldierly duties. Feeding is not a direct act of war. If they were civilians, they would still need to be fed. If instead of it being directly related to war, I would say it is directly related to the human condition, which has to be accounted for in war, like sleep.

 

For both the USACE and the Tuntian system, they found military value in non-military activities. So, I would indeed say that the use of the military is generally an aspect of war even when the use of the military is not directly tied to war; something of value can still be derived.

 

Would the threatened use of military force be considered an aspect of war?

 

Yes.

 

While “saber-rattling” is fundamentally an aspect of diplomacy, as it is merely the threatened use of military power in order to achieve a diplomatic objective, it is still an aspect of war. The reason is that if the threat isn’t credible, then the effects may not be achieved. The target of the threat needs to believe that the military force can actually achieve military objectives that would cause concern for their diplomatic efforts.

 

For example, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), or just North Korea, constantly threatens war or lobbies ambiguous threats every time the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK), or just South Korea, train together. The US and South Korea hold theater-level maneuvers and command post exercises practically every year. North Korea has threatened retaliatory military action in response; but the threats never manifest. Understandably, the first series of threats may be taken with concern, but after constantly failing to follow through on threats the US-ROK exercises continue without pause. In addition, the view of the DPRK's poor economy, starving population, and under-equipped military detract from the credibility of the threats.

 

The only viable threat that does cause concern for military planners, as well as myself when I served in South Korea for just short of three years, is the capability of their long-range artillery. Along the demilitarized zone (DMZ), they have an array of artillery installations protected by mountain bunkers or are otherwise hardened and mobile, which would take some time to neutralize. In the time it would take to finally put an end to their fire missions, the devastation and loss of life in major cities; like Seoul, would be a reason to hesitate. Yes, North Korean artillery is inaccurate; however, when your target is the center of a major metropolitan city, even if you miss the aim point by kilometers, you are still hitting civilian infrastructure. And this is just their artillery. If they can actually deploy their potential nuclear weapons against civilian targets, then that exacerbates the same problem.

 

In another example, in China’s efforts to leverage military threats against the island of Taiwan, in order to force it to reintegrate through coercion, they have flown numerous sorties near Taiwanese airspace and conducted naval exercises and fired ballistic missiles near its territory. Naturally, to respond to these threats Taiwan needs to scramble fighters as a show of force and maintain a high level of readiness at all times. This strains Taiwans limited personnel and systems while China’s military is able to cycle between many different pilots and aircraft from the mainland. The mainland can keep up higher levels of pressure over longer periods of time as they have more to work with than does Taiwan. If China were to conduct an actual invasion, they could use the threat of force for an extended duration to exhaust Taiwanese pilots and lull air warning personnel into a pattern before finally engaging in an air war. 

 

So, yes, the threatened use of military force is an aspect of war, because its use impacts the diplomatic and military capabilities of the state. By limiting what actions a state can take because of caution over enemy military action then I would  say it qualifies.

 

So, supposing that the use or threatened use of military force, or other tool of the state, with either overt or covert intentions, to influence another state’s decision making capabilities can be viewed as an aspect of war, is there anything a state can do that can’t be considered in some way an aspect of war?

 

I don’t think we can.

 

Colonel Qiao Liang and Colonel Wang Xiangsui’s perspective that warfare could include both military and nonmilitary methods in order to defeat a powerful adversary may not be that far off from a fundamental truth to humanity. In that war has relationships with other sectors of a society there is no doubt:

 

• A military force, its equipment, resources, and personnel are funded by the economy of the state. A strong economy can build up and maintain a powerful navy and standing army.

• A military force’s personnel are manned by warriors birthed by the populace and educated in its institutions. Having a pool of able-bodied and educated military-age personnel is vital to a nation’s future military potential.

• A military force is fed from the agricultural output of the state. The logistical chain from the fields of farmers to the bellies of soldiers is a science in itself.

• A military force’s ability to overmatch an enemy is based on the technological development of the state’s engineering capability. A few soldier’s with more advanced equipment and sufficient supplies can defeat scores more enemy.

• A military’s morale, resiliency, and dedication in the face of adversity are reflective of the cultures the state promotes within its civilian population and that of which is demanded of its warfighters to include the arts for which welfare and recreation can provide respite. A people with no love of their nation, and a class of warriors with no pride in their service can break or be turned against the state.

 

Indeed, I can’t foresee any element of a society that doesn’t, in some way, impact their military capacity. Even if the subject of discussion appears in no way related, I could probably argue that it is tangentially linked. In the opposing direction, the conduct of a state’s military impacts every sector of a society:

 

• The economy is impacted in the form of opportunity costs of what capital could have been spent on other than military, but also in the leverage a strong military has on the state’s ability to influence trade as well as the physical annexation of territory taken in military conquests. Not to mention the shifting to wartime manufacturing can boost development and revitalize stagnant economies.

• With modern militaries, even the lowest ranking soldiers, sailors, and airmen leave their services with many valuable leadership and problem-solving skills that were developed and cultivated during their time. A society that invests in its military personnel can see productive members applying their leadership skills in the business sector and training their employees and colleagues to become business leaders in the same way they were trained as warrior leaders.

• Since antiquity the use of the military to acquire agriculturally rich lands was vital to the prosperity of the state. Campaigns  were conducted in time with the seasons so soldiers could return home to sow and harvest accordingly.

• Humans’ need to survive drives innovation and, therefore, many technologies shaping the civilian world were spurred forth from some type of military necessity; rocketry, internet, lasers, global positioning systems, etc.

• The culture, and by extension the arts, of a society can be shaped heavily by the experiences and values of those that fight its wars and are reintegrated into society. Eras are often defined and segregated by the wars it experiences and its people shaped by their effects.

 

So, in this way, though we may like to separate the two; military and nonmilitary, I don’t think they are entirely separate in reality. They appear to be interconnected.

 

So, if everything within a society is in some way related to war, in that the nonmilitary impacts the military and the military impacts the nonmilitary,  why do we separate the two?

 

I would say the most probable reason why we would seek to separate the military from the nonmilitary would be our own limited neuronal capacity. As I mentioned in Chapter 1.4: The Human Domain, humans develop mental shortcuts, social norms, stereotypes, and the brain develops these as neuronal connections that are wired so strongly through repetitive activations that somewhat automated responses can be taken under the correct stimuli. We call them habits, and we develop them through drills and training, which allows us to quickly assess, react, and achieve results with limited brain effort. That is why you can drive long distances between work and home on auto-pilot, or why it is difficult and stressful to first tackle a task until it becomes second nature and can be done with ease.

 

But while the around 86 billion neurons or so in the brain may seem like a lot, it really isn’t much to support constant critical thought. So we focus on analyzing one topic at a time through our frontal cortex, while the rest of the brain handles the other functions. For example, I am engaging my frontal cortex to critically think about what I am writing about in this very paragraph and choosing my words carefully, reading and rereading the passage to ensure my concept is fully fleshed out and easy to understand. The frontal cortex is getting info from other portions of the brain for visual and tactile stimuli and the motor cortex then provides signals to fine motor functions in the fingers to type the correct letters in the correct order to make these words. My breathing and blinking is functionally automated, and I am listening to music to create ambiance so that outside distractions are less likely to take my focus away from this one task. The rest of my body's functions; digestion, heartbeat, repairs, and whatnot, are already controlled by automated processes within the brain. The bottom line of what I am saying is, my brain is only good for doing this one task of writing well with critical thought, only because the majority of the brain is focused on simply keeping everything functioning. It can’t do much else.

 

So, because the brain is limited in its cognitive abilities; regardless of how evolutionarily advanced humans may appear compared to other species, we can only do such advanced things by streamlining reactions and stereotyping the things we perceive into manageable categories. We categorize things as “war” and “not war” because we seek to quickly lump these topics into categories so that we can move on to something else that may concern us more.

 

If I say the term “explosive expert,” there are various things that may appear in your mind. One could be a combat engineer blowing up bridges or clearing helicopter landing zones. One could be in the service of a mining company blowing a gravel quarry or creating tunnels and cuts in the mountain for road and rail. One could be in architectural explosives providing controlled demolitions to remove old structures to make way for new developments. And one could simply be a manufacturer of explosive materials that supply the explosives to all the other aforementioned “explosive experts.” It takes critical thought to think about all the different permutations of a single term, but when we first hear the term spoken, we may imagine a category, a stereotype, that the word may fall under and carry on without further thought.

 

For another example, imagine what comes to mind when I say  “a show about the military.” You may think about combat, hardships amongst warfighters, and the consequences of politics being handled at the soldier level. Now, think about what comes to mind when I say “a medical drama.” You may think about doctors and nurses conducting triage, performing life-saving operations, and engaging in topics on medical ethics. Now, think about what a “sitcom” looks like. You think about a group of people in a slice-of-life situation, joking about their problems and being put in absurd scenarios with a laugh track in the background. Now, think about a show that is “anti-war.” You may think about a documentary or political debate discussing geopolitics, military adventurism, battle fatigue, and the ethics of war itself. Now, combining it all, think of an anti-war show that is a military sitcom medical drama. If you know your shows, then what I am talking about is M.A.S.H. A show whose setting was the Korean War about the doctors, surgeons, medics, and support staff of a mobile field hospital that used humor to make levity about the serious consequences of war and was a critique of America's involvement in Vietnam.

 

These categories are used to simplify complex topics into something that is easy for us to understand. Not all war shows are about battles, explosions, and killing, but those criteria are used to categorize it as such. Not all medical dramas are about sexy doctors and nurses performing their rounds during the day and having affairs at night. Not all sitcoms are about friends or middle-aged women in the city trying to find love. Not all anti-war shows are overt and clear in their messaging. This is all just stereotyping in order to make things easier for us to understand at a glance. We can always look at the context and the nuance to fully describe a topic in all its parameters, but if not necessary, we simply pigeonhole it and carry on.

 

So, this big tangent aside, we think of things as military and nonmilitary, as warfare and not warfare, simply because we want to understand a situation clearly and move on. If we dig into a topic, such as economic embargoes, trade deals, alliances, cultural exchange, blockades, invasions, preemptive strikes, peace talks, and whatnot, by labeling them as either “war” or “not war,” that is so we can quickly understand it and move on. If we analyze a way or means, such as a rifle, a bomb, a tractor, a car, a fishing boat, computers, planes, clothing, and whatnot, as having either military or nonmilitary purposes, then that is the same. It is all about humans influencing other humans for their benefit. The ways, means, and ends of the state are both military and nonmilitary, and their methods are neither and both related to war at the same time. In the end, what matters is the form of influence. It is a negative or positive compulsion, violent influence or cooperative influence, as I have said. The differentiation between military and nonmilitary is simply a cognitive tool we use to make our lives easier, but it isn’t necessarily accurate.

 

Both military and nonmilitary aspects of society are related to war, so what is the purpose of war compared to what we would consider not war?

 

Simply put, the purpose of war is to achieve objectives through violence that could not be achieved effectively or desirably through cooperation. These two forms of influence, violence and cooperation, whether actual or potential, drive the decision-making processes of individuals or groups; including nations. While the category of war is not completely violent, it could be considered a predominantly negative form of compulsion as the intent is to compel others down a certain path out of caution. This is what differentiates other activities that we would not consider an aspect of war, that seek to produce a positive form of compulsion out of a desire to benefit by aligning with our interests; such as getting access to investments or favored nation privileges for commodities and energy trade. It is here we must contextualize how we are seeking to compel another to engage in a certain course of action or engage us and others in a certain way.

 

If a nation desires to compel a target nation in a certain way, then they have two directions they can choose and both can be use simultaneously for best effect:

 

• There is a negative compulsion, in that the target nation believes that if they don’t change in some way, there will be negative consequences. They are reluctantly compelled to do certain things because if they don't, then it might be disadvantageous. War, through the tool of violent influence, often falls in this direction.

 

• The other is a positive compulsion, in that the target nation believes that if they change in some way there will be positive consequences. They are eager to change for the advantages it may bring them. Forms of cooperative influence, like trade and capital investment, often fall in this direction.

 

A nation can use both in a “carrot-and-stick” approach by promoting the benefits of healthy cooperation while alluding to the dangers if things don’t stay cooperative; like “gun-boat diplomacy.” And while aspects of war are commonly associated with negative compulsion, there are times when it can be positive, such as the desire to bring in another ally into an ongoing conflict or to gain some security agreement for protection. Conversely, while cooperation is often associated with positive compulsion, there are times when cooperating is done in spite of negative consequences.

 

It will be up to the state, to a nation’s leadership, to decide what tools to use to compel the changes in others necessary to set itself in a position of advantage. There are positive and negative ways to compel that change, but it will be done through various forms of violent and cooperative influence. The purpose of any tool we use is to shape conditions to our desired endstate, and while the tools of diplomacy and trade can achieve purpose through a more positive and cooperative direction, war is often the converse when the other isn’t likely to achieve it alone, and it will be up the state to determine how best to go about it; taking into account short-term and long-term consequences.

 

The purpose of war, therefore, is to compel another group towards a desired policy change through the use or threatened use of violent forms of influence.

 

So, if war is more in line with violent negative compulsion and business is more in line with cooperative positive compulsion, why do you propose to say that businesses can learn from military theory, principles, and tenets?

 

The reason you can learn from the military and apply it to the business sector is that most of what a military does is not violent but cooperative in nature. Indeed, the reason we classify “the military” and “war” as violent is because of their very destructive, horrific, and bloody consequences. But only some of these consequences from military activities are violent, most are cooperative in nature. By the nature of how a military actually functions during times of peace and war, you can find lessons to learn that are applicable to business. Here is what I am going to propose to you:

 

1. Most military activities are cooperative and could be compared to business activities.

2. Most of the results of military activity are cooperative and could be compared to those found in business.

3. Only a few of the consequences of military activity are violent in nature, and these could only be indirectly applied to the business sector.

4. The military needs to be capable of violent actions in hazardous environments as that is what defines its purpose, which is uniquely military and not directly applicable to business environments.

5. As a result, the military is shaped by this small element of conducting violence in a hazardous environment, so every facet of the military is enveloped in an aura of intensity, seriousness, and catastrophe.

6. And it is here where we can find the lessons that we can transfer over to business development.

 

For the first three points, for all of human history, warriors don’t spend the preponderance of their waking hours killing people and destroying stuff. That is only the consequences of certain actions, but the actions that lead up to the violent conclusions themselves are not necessarily violent and are far more cooperative. For example, leading up to a battle you have other organizational efforts that need to occur to set the conditions. You will have mobilizations, training, equipping, deployments, intel gathering, planning, logistics, movement, and the whole cacophony of warfighting functions working together through lines of effort to attempt to set the best conditions for battle. All of these activities require a degree of cooperation between the various subject matter experts and personnel charged with providing these capabilities. Yes, destroying an enemy tank or blowing up a building is a violent act, but everything that comes together to make that occur is a team effort.

 

On the other hand, when the consequences aren’t related to the violent conclusions of battle; killing and destroying, it is all cooperative. Yes, the combat training a unit undertakes appears violent, but the motivations for action are a little different than actual violence. The warriors who train to fight aren’t concerned about the loss of their lives and that of their buddies, or of the consequences to their freedoms and that of their families. Their concerns are related to job performance and appearing competent to superiors, peers, and subordinates. When you see soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmen train in their combat-related tasks they may appear as if they were in combat, but the mindset is slightly different as none of them intends for the training to result in the death or capture of anyone involved; though safety is a concern when maneuvering multi-ton vehicles and engaging in exhausting and complex maneuvers. They go through the motions in the stressful environment of performance evaluations so that when the stress is related to literal life-and-death combat they can do their jobs while under this different type of stress.

 

Even though units both train for combat and execute combat operations, all mostly cooperative activities, many units are not directly related to combat roles. Modern militaries use tooth-to-tail ratios (T3R) to describe the relationship between combat personnel and the support personnel needed to keep the combat personnel supplied and ready to fight. While army combat personnel include infantry, tankers, artillerymen, attack aviation pilots, etc., the support personnel include logisticians, cooks, repairmen, financial and human resource personnel, communications, etc. Modern high-tech mechanized forces may need a greater T3R based on the requirements to keep them maintained and ready, and this differs between nations and even time periods. So while modern U.S. Army mechanized units may have a T3R of 1:8 the U.S. Army in WWI may be around 1:2. Now, even truck drivers, cooks, and repairmen in a combat theater need to have some combat training as they are legitimate targets for attack and need to be prepared to defend themselves and their stuff, but their training can be much more simplified and limited than the actual units in combat roles.

 

Even saying this, I have been a combat arms Soldier for most of my career (first as an infantryman in the Oregon National Guard and second as an artillery officer in the Regular Army), and we only periodically conducted combat training events. You have qualifications on personal weapons, crew qualifications on our combat vehicles, and collective training with companies, batteries, battalions, brigades, and the division. The culmination of all this training was a few moments of actually shooting or blowing something up, and mostly it involved planning, preparations, activities leading up to execution, and then after action recovery. For one hour of something related to actual combat, it could be preceded and followed by a few hundred working hours of preparation and post-assessment; spread over a few months, to get everything executed at the time of training.

 

But not everything is always geared towards preparing for training or conducting combat operations, but instead are other things that benefit the unit or are required by government oversight. We conduct various holiday events with families, repairs, and maintenance of our vehicles, physical training every morning, charity drives, internal inspections, external audits, commander’s investigations, and lots of meetings and PowerPoint presentations that we need to make. This “other stuff” makes up most of our time in a military unit, or at least for the U.S. Army from personal experience and anecdotes, and varies slightly based on the type of unit and its mission.

 

I say all of these things simply to showcase an important truth about the military, especially in relation to the modern conflicts we find ourselves in. The actual violent actions in war are done by only a small proportion of people; itself  being rare compared to the other activities that they must do during war, but there are tons of people engaging in cooperative actions that help facilitate those few violent people and enable them to do their jobs and accomplish objectives. Outside of war, combat training is all cooperative action, and violence is purely accidental. And outside of training for combat, most of the things a unit does is no different than what one might find in a large civilian corporation.

 

We spoke briefly about DOTMLPF in the previous section when discussing Giulio Douhet, and we spoke at greater length about it in Chapter 1.5: Bridging the Civil-Military Divide. DOTMLPF, an acronym that stands for “doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities” helps conceptualize the structure and capacity of a military organization that is needed to accomplish its assigned mission and tasks associated with that mission. Commonly, it is used to troubleshoot problems we identify within the services should they lack a capability, or within a training unit should they fail at a particular task. We look at DOTMLPF and see what could be improved to correct the deficiency within an organization. Now, there is nothing unique about DOTMLPF that makes it military, only that the military is the one that uses it. Businesses are structured and have capabilities under the same categories. That is why I made the connection.

 

Most of what the military does is not inherently violent. There are some actions that are violent as an end product, and there are a lot of actions that facilitate those few actions that are violent, but an overwhelming number of activities are not military in nature and instead are reflective of the activities needed to keep a large human organization functioning. This is why I deconstruct things to the level of human activity; to find the theories, principles, tenets, and whatnot that apply to all human endeavors. We find the study of these concepts in the military fascinating and awe-inspiring as they are done under extreme conditions for both individuals and groups.

 

Both militaries and businesses develop doctrine that guides their work; both have organizational structures; both have training requirements; both have material concerns; both have leaders and leaders’ education curricula; both have personnel requirements; and both have a need for facilities to conduct their work. The military and businesses do mostly the same things; however, the things they have in common are ratcheted up an order of magnitude for the military due to the purpose of the military and the dangerousness of the environment. It’s always a little more serious and somber, and the consequences are more severe on the military-side of things. When failure appears on the business-side of the market then it harms the bottom line and people are fired. When failure appears on the military-side in combat, objectives are not achieved and people die. Military theories are tested in this crucible and that is why I find their study to be of great value to business. Violence is there, yes, but it is only a small facet of a larger human endeavor.

 

Is this where we branch into discussing the purpose of war from the business sector’s perspective?

 

Yes.

 

I began this chapter discussing the earliest forms of warfare and noted that human males were prone to engage in organized violence as a result of evolutionary drivers; competition for limited resources and mates as well as the benefits of cooperative activities. Since males make up half of the human population, it is understandable that this foundational element of collective violence would see itself perpetuated in other mediums of human life; oral stories, plays, music, both fiction and non-fiction writing, games, and movies. And, in turn, this shaping of our culture influences other sectors, like business. This is why the study of military theory finds its applicable uses in business development, such as the prevalent use of Sun-Tzu’s The Art of War or in the leadership classes provided by former service members such as Echelon Front by Navy SEALs Jocko Willink and Leif Babin.

 

Instead of the competitive environment of the natural world where survival was a daily struggle for the preponderance of our species’ existence, we see it carried on into the business world. The competition between males to attract female partners still exists, but instead of competition through displays of violent domination; a form of evidence of the male's ability to protect and provide, they compete against each other indirectly by holding positions of power, prestige, and careers that provide greater means that modern females would find attractive. The competition between groups of humans; a necessity of our past that still continues to this day between nations and criminal entities, also permeates itself in the form of competition between competing businesses. And here we begin our discussion of the application of the purpose of war for business.